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Abstract 
Cooperation is at the centre of human nature and at the heart of social 
transformations. Grasping how strangers cooperate and behave with each 
other may permit a better understanding of the way societies function and can 
develop as they modernize. To advance this comprehension, this study 
examines whether humans are naturally predisposed towards cooperation or 
selfishness, and how their behavior changes when people have more time to 
think. To answer these questions, the study implements an original natural field 
experiment which exogenously varies response times (through average human 
walking time) to analyze the intuitive and rational underpinnings of human 
behavior. The experimental findings suggest that while humans are naturally 
inclined to help each other, they start behaving more selfishly as thinking time 
increases. There is also clear evidence that humans are prone to withhold help 
when strangers violate social norms and the likelihood of such indirect 
punishment increases when they have more time to think. 
Keywords 
Cooperation, natural field experiment, dual-reasoning, The Hague. 
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Intuitive cooperation in The Hague1 
1 Introduction 
This research paper studies the nature of human cooperation. The study of 
human cooperation is important as modern societies are characterized by 
numerous encounters between strangers, where every individual has to pay a 
personal cost to help another person. In this sense, this research seeks to 
answer the following questions: Are humans intrinsically predisposed to 
altruistically cooperate with others or to selfishly refuse help? Do humans shift 
these innate predispositions after balancing their moral obligations with their 
personal costs of helping?  
With these main questions in mind, the present study adopts a dual-
reasoning framework to design an original natural field experiment in 
cooperation. The idea behind the dual-reasoning framework is that humans are 
able to examine information and make decisions via two processes. “Thinking 
intuitively” is the first process. It is linked to those faster and unconscious 
decisions based on prior experience, beliefs and instinct. “Thinking rationally” 
is the second process. It is linked to those slower and more rational decisions, 
for instance, after analyzing the costs and benefits of undertaking a specific 
action. Therefore, by studying these processes in human cooperation, the 
preset research attempts to answer the aforementioned questions.  
Several laboratory experiments have revealed insights on these questions. 
Researchers have examined the decision to cooperate using particular 
experimental games. These games examine whether participants of an 
experiment altruistically cooperate with each other or selfishly deflect 
                                                 
1 The results of this research paper are an expression of my appreciation to many 
special people. First and foremost, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my 
supervisor and mentor in experimental economics Prof. Matthias Rieger. His advises 
and teachings will support my future research and my academic life. Second, I am 
truly thankful to Prof. Arjun Bedi. I will always cherish his guidance and critical 
feedback during this process. His suggestions have encouraged me to pursue the best 
possible quality of research.  
 
I would also like to thank the Department of Economics of Development and 
Emerging Markets (EDEM) for supporting me with the funding that made this 
experiment possible. In particular, I want to thank Prof. Lorenzo Pellegrini and the 
ISS staff members that helped me with the process. Additionally, I wish to thank all 
the participants of the experiment who let me gathered the data to convey my 
research. I appreciate your patience and time.  
 
I am especially grateful to Maria Dafnomili for her persistence, kindliness and 
outstanding research skills. I would have not being able to undertake and finish this 
exercise without you. Moreover, I wish to thank all of my friends at ISS for their 
company, discussions and patience; especially to Amartya and Rion: your support 
during this academic year is much cherished. Finally, I wish to thank my parents and 
my brother for their continuous encouragement and support in pursuing my academic 
and professional goals. 
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cooperation. In addition, by using limits on response times, these games are 
also able to stimulate participants to make faster and slower decisions, 
encouraging intuitive and rational thinking, respectively. In an early study, 
Rand et al. (2012) find that humans are naturally predisposed towards 
cooperation, but tend to behave more selfish as thinking time increases. 
However, these initial results have been contested in later replications.  
Two subsequent replications have obtained different results. Tinghög et al. 
(2013) replicate Rand et al. (2012) through five laboratory experiments. They 
find no causal effect of time on the decisions to cooperate. Thus, the results of 
this second paper suggests that humans do not reveal any distinctive 
predisposition towards altruism or selfishness, nor does the study find that 
decisions change when individuals have additional time to think. Subsequently, 
Recalde et al. (2015) evaluates how confusion and error of the participants 
could affect the experimental results. With this hypothesis in mind, this third 
paper adjusts the dominant strategy of the games, finding that variations in the 
rates of cooperation are a consequence of human mistake. The researches 
argue that cooperative outcomes may be a consequence of forcing participants 
to decide extremely quickly rather than an actual innate predisposition to 
cooperate.  
Considering the mixed evidence, this research proposes a novel natural 
field experiment to assess these questions without the artificiality of laboratory 
experiments. The experiment uses actors to elicit cooperation while at the 
same time varies response times. The actor represents a typical citizen of the 
society. Thus, by randomly assigning participants to the experimental 
treatments, the proposed methodology is able to answer the main question of 
this study and to offer inferences about the population under analysis. Finally, 
due to the ideal characteristics of the location, the experiment is conducted in 
the main sidewalk of Park Malieveld in The Hague, The Netherlands (NL). 
In addition to examine human cooperation, the experiment also 
scrutinizes two additional issues. First, it investigates on the natural state of 
man to punish individuals that fail to follow social norms. To investigate this 
question, the study evaluates indirect punishment, testing whether humans are 
innately inclined to withhold help to norm-violators; and, whether people tend 
to punish more when they have more time to think. Second, the study aims to 
answer whether the gender of the actor influence the decision to cooperate or 
punish.  
To answer the aforementioned questions, this paper contributes to the 
existing literature in several ways. A general contribution is that it explores the 
nature of human cooperation, the ways in which humans interact with each 
other and make decisions. In this sense, the study can distinguish whether 
humans are naturally altruistic or selfish with strangers, and whether they shift 
their innate behavior when thinking more carefully about the personal costs of 
helping and their moral and social obligations.  
Furthermore, the proposed methodology possesses four novelties to the 
literature on experimental and behavioral economics. First, the study proposes 
a helping-norm as a real-life approximation of the PGGs. Second, this study 
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designs an original natural field experiment to assess the propensities to 
cooperate via “intuitive thinking” and “rational thinking”. Third, this work 
evaluates these two processes of thinking on punitive behavior. Fourth and 
lastly, by forcing the participants to pay a cost in terms of time and effort to 
help, the experimental design diminishes the mistakes and confusion found in 
previous laboratory experiments.  
To preview the results, the study finds a causal effect of thinking time on 
social behavior. The findings suggest that the citizens of The Hague are 
naturally predisposed to cooperate with other members of the community, but 
they behave more selfish as they have more time to think. In particular, the 
propensity to cooperate declines from 72 percentage points (pp) to 52 pp 
between faster and slower decisions, respectively. The results remain stable 
after controlling for the gender of the individual that needs help (actor). 
Compared to previous studies, the results of this paper are similar to Rand et 
al. (2012), but different from Tinghög et al. (2013). For the case of indirect 
punishment, the findings suggest that the citizens of The Hague are naturally 
predisposed to withhold help if individuals fail to follow social norms, and that 
that increase the punishment in time. Analogously to Balaoufas et al. (2014), 
this paper finds an “intuitive” indirect punishment close to 20 pp; but it also 
finds additional evidence that individual increase the punishment up to 36 pp 
as time increases. In addition, results suggest that males inflict an extra 
punishment of 26p.p on other male-violators. Lastly and more importantly, 
econometric analysis and robustness checks confirm these results. 
This study also opens avenues for future research: Participants have 
different capabilities to process information. This study provides average 
effects across individuals, but some participants may decide faster or slower 
independently of treatment exposure. Future research could investigate 
heterogeneous effects by cognitive processing speeds of individuals. As a 
related topic, it would be interesting to replicate the experiments across 
different societies and settings to evaluate regional and contextual differences.  
The present paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the most 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 motivates the empirical strategy used in this 
research. Chapter 4 describes the experimental data gathered. Chapter 5 
presents the results. Chapter 6 compares the results with previous literature, 
discussing implications and opportunities for future research. Finally, Chapter 
7 outlines the main conclusions of the study.  
2 Literature review 
This chapter has three objectives. The first objective is to define the two 
processes of human reasoning and link them to human cooperation. The sec-
ond objective is to describe how the concept of cooperation between 
individuals can be conceived as a public good in modern societies. For this 
purpose, the chapter reviews the existing empirical studies using public good 
games. Last but not least, the third objective is to outline the benefits of using 
natural field experiments for social research. 
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2.1 Two processes of reasoning in human behaviour 
Initial hints about two processes of reasoning in human behavior can be found 
since the Ancient Greeks. They debated how humans suffer from inner 
personal conflicts when making decisions that involve actions of self-sacrifice 
and self-interest (Frankish & Evans, 2009). What is more, they contrasted two 
ways in which humans make decisions. While “desires and spontaneity” drive 
different shortsighted, emotional and passionate decisions; “reasoning and 
wisdom” drive more analytical and carefully taken decisions (Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2004). However, once the influence of the Greek civilization 
decreased, the aforementioned discussions were postponed until most recent 
times.  
It was not until the Industrial Revolution when Adam Smith (1759) 
regained the intellectual interest in these debates. In his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he emphasized how individuals make decisions in two ways; 
discussing that while some decisions are spontaneous, impulsive and 
emotional, others are more dispassionate and moderated. In particular, he 
argued that while the former are guided by instincts and emotions (what he 
describes as “animal spirits”), the latter evaluate the moral norms and 
standards of the society to make more impartial decisions (what A. Smith 
mentions as an “impartial spectator”) (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004; 
Albanese, 2006; Kaufman, 2006). Remarkably enough, subsequent advances in 
Psychology and Neuroscience would confirm these old philosophical ideas by 
giving a more scientific perspective.  
In the course of time, and, more specifically, during the Twentieth 
Century, Psychology confirmed the presence of two types of human reasoning. 
Chaiken and Trope (1999), and more recently Kahneman (2012) explains how 
humans make all social and economic decisions through conscious and 
unconscious processes. To provide a more straightforward illustration, 
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) exemplify these decisions through a set of “hot 
and cold” systems. Whereas the “hot system” encourages spontaneous, 
impulsive and emotional behaviors; the “cold system” develops more 
controlled and rational behaviors, but only after the situation is analyzed more 
calmly. In this manner, the study of these two systems have become of primary 
importance to analyze social behavior. 
Furthermore, recent advances in Neuroscience have confirmed the 
existence of these two types of human reasoning. By the end of the Twentieth 
Century, Neuroscience revealed that two brain systems shape the way modern 
humans make decisions. Cory (2006)2 mentions how the application of 
sophisticated neurological techniques3 has exposed the presence of three brain 
systems: an older affectional program, a younger self-preservation program and 
an executive program. More importantly, each of these programs drive 
particular behaviors. On one side, the affectional program is strongly activated 
                                                 
2 The author explains this evidence using the Conflicts System Neuro-behavioral 
Model.  
3 Such as functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
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when humans undertake social activities and requires less time to work. Thus, 
this program triggers more impulsive, emotional and unconscious behaviors. 
On another side, the self-preservation program is activated when humans 
convey more analytical activities and requires more time and effort to work. 
Thus, this program encourages more conscious, rational and controlled 
behaviors. Lastly, the executive program implements the final decisions. 
Therefore, this evidence has clarified the presence of two processes of human 
reasoning.  
Following the aforementioned developments, academia deepen the 
analysis of these two processes with the purpose to explain how they shape 
human behavior.  In particular, Kahneman (2012) distinguishes them as: 
“System-1” and “System-2”. Intuition guides the decisions of the “System-1”, 
encouraging more instinctive and automatic behaviors. “Thinking intuitively” 
is used when individuals do not have enough time to decide which the correct 
decision is or do not want to over think it. Intuition is in charge to find quick 
answers to very complex or uncertain situations. Thus, the decisions of the 
“System-1” are conventionally described as “fast, effortless, affective, 
nonverbal and rapid” (Frantz, 2006; Kahneman, 2012). Evans and Stanovich 
(2013) mention that intuition is based in preexisting knowledge and beliefs; and 
as a consequence, “thinking intuitively” contrasts to the “System-2”: “thinking 
rationally”. 
Table 1 
Features of “intuitive thinking” and “rational thinking” 
Type-1 process (intuition) Type-2 process (rational) 
Fast Slow 
Automatic Capacity limited 
Biased responses Conscious 
Experience-based Normative responses 
High capacity Abstract 
Independent of cognitive ability Controlled 
Non-conscious Rule-based 
Contextualized Consequential decision making 
Parallel Correlates with cognitive ability 
System-1 (old brain structure) System-2 (new brain structure) 
Evolved early Evolved late 
Similar to animal cognition Distinctively human 
Implicit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
Basic emotions Complex emotions 
Source: Figure taken from Evans and Stanovich (2013) 
Kahneman (2012) mentions that “System-2” promotes higher levels of 
rational thinking. The decisions of this second system are implemented once 
the “intuitive decisions” of the “Type-1” system have been assessed and 
rejected as valid behaviors for the given situation (Frantz, 2006; Rieskamp et al. 
13 
 
2006; Kaufman, 2006). In this sense, “thinking rationally” is also referred to 
those “slower, controlled, rule-based, analytical and reflective” decisions 
(Frantz, 2006; Kahneman, 2012). Despite the increase in rational analysis, the 
cognitive capabilities of each individual limit the spectrum of potential 
decisions to be taken (Johnson et al. 2014). Considering the contrasting 
characteristics between “thinking intuitively” and “thinking rationally”, these 
processes have been also categorized as “dual-processes of human reasoning” 
and “dual-reasoning processes” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Table 1 
characterizes the distinctive features of these two processes.  
These findings have encouraged innovative research in many fields. In 
particular, to the Economic Science, these findings have illuminated how 
cognition explains how and why individuals make particular economic and 
social decisions. For instance, its study enables the recognition of the 
mechanisms by which humans consume, invest and cooperate. 4 The present 
study is interested in the relation between cognition and the latter in human 
behavior.  
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) formulates a suitable framework on 
how dual-reasoning can influence human behavior. In this framework, the 
speed of each situation and the analytical capabilities of each individual drive 
their intuitive and rational decisions. The authors mention that intuition is 
emotional and automatic in nature. Thus, intuition can encourage sudden and 
extremes decisions of altruism or selfishness. Meanwhile, rational decisions are 
more goal-oriented and circumstantial. Thus, they are able to assess the costs 
and benefits of adopting a specific behavior in a given situation. For instance, 
rational decisions could balance the moral and social obligations with the 
personal costs of carrying out a specific behavior. Accordingly, rational 
decisions could resemble the intuitive decisions or could completely contest 
them (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004). In this manner, this model is able 
to bridge the link between the two forms of human reasoning with social 
behavior5.  
Studying the influence of cognition in social behavior can improve the 
understanding of human cooperation. In particular, encouraging intuition 
enables the recognition of whether humans are naturally predisposed to be 
selfish or altruistic to other members. Meanwhile, studying rational decisions 
clarifies whether individuals shift their naturally predisposed behaviors with 
                                                 
4 Likewise, these advances have break the ground for the nascent field of neuro-
economics. This field researches on how brain structures and neuro-transmissors 
influence decision making processes (Fehr & Rangel, 2011; Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). 
5 These conceptions have been embraced and expanded by further frameworks. Lynne 
(2006) proposes that individuals make decisions based on social and private 
preferences. The framework comprises a utility function that maximizes social 
decisions (about the well-being of the others) and egoistic decisions (about the best 
self-interest for the individual). In the process of taking every decision, an individual 
has to balance his/her interests with the interests of the others, weighting his/her own 
survival with the harmony of the society. At equilibrium, the behavior of an individual 
would ensure self-preservation and social harmony.  
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more careful thinking. For instance, after weighting the moral and social 
obligations with their own best self-interested action.  
As it is explained in the following section 2.2, recent laboratory 
experiments have contributed in this type of research using Public Good 
Games (PGGs). These experimental games approximate decisions to 
cooperate to public goods, enabling the study of altruism and selfishness in 
human cooperation. Moreover, the application of limits on response times to 
promote intuitive and rational decisions, enabling the research on how humans 
are naturally inclined towards altruism or selfishness; and, how rational 
thinking could modify their innate decisions (Rand et al. 2012; Rand et al. 
2014). The following section reviews theoretical and empirical literature on this 
matter. 
2.2 Dual-reasoning in cooperation: evidence of altruism 
and selfishness using public good games 
The aim of this section is threefold. The first aim of this section is to define 
human cooperation as a public good in modern societies. The second aim is to 
describe the methodology of Public Good Games and to outline how they 
emulate decisions to cooperate in laboratory experiments. The third aim is to 
examine recent empirical evidence on Public Good Games, reviewing their 
insights for the current research.  
Cooperation as a public good: a proxy for altruistic and selfish 
behaviors in modern societies 
Human cooperation is unique in modern societies as each individual has to pay 
a personal cost to benefit another human being (Nowak, 2006; Rand & 
Nowak, 2013). Particularly, if all members of a society choose to cooperate, the 
whole society is better off. In this process, the members of the society 
strengthen common ties, trust and social networking which boosts 
socioeconomic efficiency in the short run and economic development in the 
long run (Putnam, 1993; Helliwell & Puntnam, 1995; Rand & Nowak, 2013). 
The relationship between human cooperation, social capital6 and 
economic improvement is multifaceted. Initially, cooperation boosts social 
capital through advancements in social trust and networking among the 
members of a group (Nguyen & Rieger, 2014). Leonard et al. (2010) describe 
that positive exchanges between members of a community improve their trust, 
values, group spirit and social cohesion. These upgrades (in social capital) 
inspire individuals to act more effectively among themselves, improving the 
efficiency and well-being at the aggregate levels, boosting economic advancing 
(Putnam, 1993; Helliwell & Puntnam, 1995; Ludwig et al, 2007).  
                                                 
6 Putnam (1993) describes social capital as the “trust, norms and networks that inspire 
intra-group cooperation and coordination” for the mutual benefit of all its members. 
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Conversely, social capital preserves and strengthens intra-group 
cooperation through the enforcement of the social norms7 by which 
individuals coexist in their community (Nguyen & Rieger, 2014). The 
enforcement of social norms preserves the rules of the community and secures 
the wellbeing and prosperity of the society (Putnam, 1993; Champlin, 1999; 
Kay, 2006). For instance, the social norm of cooperation motivates an 
individual to help another for the amelioration of their community. The 
enforcement of the norm of cooperation improves social capital through the 
increase in trust and social cohesion, strengthening its own preservation in this 
manner (Putnam, 1993; Helliwell & Puntnam, 1995; Kaul & Grunberg, 1999; 
Miguel; 2004; Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). 
Considering those attributions, the cooperation-norm can be characterized 
as a public good in modern societies (Champlin, 1999; Nowak, 2006; Rand & 
Novak, 2013). According to the classic public goods theory, this conception is 
valid as cooperation is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. First, it is non-
rivalrous as the cooperation of one individual does not limit the cooperation of 
another individual. Instead, all individuals are able to enjoy the benefits of the 
service without interfering with the benefits of the other members (Holcombe, 
1997; Champlin, 1999; Cowen, 2008). Second, cooperation is “non-excludable” 
as it is not possible to exclude an individual from the help given by another 
member. In this sense, all the members of a society are able to benefit if every 
individual decides to enforce (and preserve) the norm of cooperating to each 
other (Holcombe, 1997; Champlin, 1999; Cowen, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the personal costs of enforcing the norm of cooperation 
provide incentives to free-ride. Considering the time and effort to assist 
another member, individuals have incentives to refuse cooperation and free 
ride on the generosity of the other members (Putnam, 1993; Champlin, 1999; 
Nowak, 2006; Rand & Novak, 2013). In particular, as it is not possible to 
exclude the individuals that do not cooperate nor to charge for the service, 
individuals can refuse to cooperate without stop receiving the benefits of the 
norm (Holcombe; 1997; Cowen, 2008; Nguyen & Rieger, 2014).  
Accordingly, enforcing the norm of cooperation comprises a decision 
between altruism and selfishness. As norm-deflectors are able to obtain the 
benefits without paying the personal costs, free riding on the cooperation of 
the other members becomes the best self-interested strategy. While the 
decision to cooperate approximates altruism, refusing to follow the norm of 
cooperation is taken as a proxy for selfishness (Nowak, 2006; Rand et al, 2012; 
Rand et al, 2014).  
Reciprocity effects can play an important role in the decisions to 
cooperate. These effects are strongly present when two individuals know each 
other or when there is a high probability of a future encounter (Nowak, 2006; 
                                                 
7 Social norms comprise the “rules, values and beliefs” that govern the conduct of a 
community. Social norms delimit social functions, motivate positive behaviors and 
discourage inappropriate ones. Hence, they influence the efficiency of the social 
relations and the economic interactions of every society (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2015).   
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Tyler, 2008; Rand & Nowak, 2013). More specifically, an individual may decide 
to cooperate with the other just to follow a broader self-interested strategy. 
This happens as the individual knows he/she may need help from the second 
person in the foreseeable future and not helping (now) decreases the likelihood 
of that event. In other words, the individuals would help just because he/she 
knows that by not helping the second individual, he/she might be affecting 
himself/herself in the future (Nowak, 2006; Rand & Novak, 2013). In this way, 
reciprocity effects influence human cooperation; cooperating not because of 
innate altruism, but because of a desire to maximize personal benefits in the 
future.  
Likewise, social pressures can drive the enforcement of the norm of 
cooperation through fame incentives or personal motives (Champlin, 1999; 
Tyler, 2008). In the first case, an individual could cooperate with the sole 
purpose to seek recognition and admiration from other members. In the 
second case, an individual could cooperate as a consequence of peer pressure 
or feelings of guilt. Both of these cases affect the motivations of individuals, 
distorting the correct analysis of the nature of human cooperation. 
The enforcement of the helping-norm conveys a practical example of the 
cooperation-norm. First, all members of the society are better-off when all 
members preserve the norm by helping each other (Putnam, 1995). Thus, 
members have the moral and social obligation to follow the social norm of 
helping each other. Nevertheless, an individual is tempted to refuse help to 
avoid paying the personal costs of helping (in terms of time and effort). These 
costs incentivize members to deflect assistance and free ride on the help that 
the other members give. Moreover, reciprocity effects and social pressures can 
also readjust the intrinsic motivations of the members (Nowak, 2006).  
Considering its dual motives, studying the norm of cooperation can 
improve the understanding of human nature and social behavior. By 
eliminating reciprocity effects and social pressures, the decisions to enforce the 
cooperation-norm (i.e. helping-norm) can provide insights on the levels of 
altruism and selfishness of individuals of modern societies. For instance, while 
a strong enforcement of the norm of cooperation indicates high levels of 
altruism and low levels of selfishness among the individuals of a society, its 
weak enforcement would indicate low levels of altruism and high levels of 
selfishness (Gächter, 2012). Based on these trade-offs, recent laboratory 
experiments have designed Public Good Games to study these concerns.  
Public good games in laboratory experiments 
Researchers use Public Goods Games (PGGs) to analyze the levels of 
cooperation between individuals. These games evaluate the willingness to 
contribute to a public good, providing appropriate measures of the levels of 
altruism and selfishness of the participants. At the macro level, these games 
emulate the decisions to cooperate between strangers of modern societies 
(Andreoni, 1995; Anderson et al. 2004; Capraro et al. 2014). 
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PPGs emulate the decisions to cooperate to a public good. Each game 
starts by clustering participants into small groups8 and giving a fix amount of 
money to each member. Then, the game gives each participant a “one-time 
opportunity” to contribute (partially or totally) to a “public pot” or to keep the 
money (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Recalde et al. 2015). 
Prior to this decision, every member is informed that the total amount of 
contributions in the public pot will be multiplied (by a factor greater than one 
but lower than the number of participants) and divided equally among the 
group. Furthermore, each member makes a private and anonymous decision. 
This is done to avoid social pressures and reciprocity effects that may distort 
their true responses (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001). 
Therefore, these games comprise “one-time decisions between strangers of a 
group”. 
If every participant decides to contribute to the “public pot” with his/her 
full amount, the entire group will be better off. This happens as the total 
amount is multiplied by a factor greater than one and shared equally among the 
members. Nonetheless, if they realize the unlikeliness of this outcome, each 
participant has private incentives not to contribute and free ride on the 
cooperation of the others that do contribute (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 
Fischbacher et al.  2001). Therefore, members have to decide between the 
aggregate benefits of cooperating to the public pot with their best self-
interested strategy of free-riding on the generosity of the others.  
Evidence of dual-reasoning in public good games 
Recent laboratory experiments have used Public Good Games to provide 
empirical insights on the altruistic and selfish inclinations of humans. Rand et 
al. (2012) provide a first evidence on this subject using limits on response time 
to evaluate the influence of intuitive and rational thinking in the level of 
contributions to the public pot9. More specifically, the experiment forced 
participants to make decisions based on two time-treatments. The first “time-
pressured” treatment forced them to make decisions before 10 seconds. This 
condition encourages intuitive thinking. Conversely, the second “time-delayed” 
treatment required participants to wait at least 10 seconds. This condition 
encourages rational thinking. 
As suggested by the title of the paper, ‘Spontaneous giving and calculated greed’, 
the results suggest that humans are naturally altruistic with other members of 
their group. However, humans become more self-interested and refuse to 
cooperate as they undertake more rational thinking (Rand et al, 2012). Figure 1 
                                                 
8 Typically, the participant groups are formed with four or five undergraduate 
students.  
9 Rubinstein (2007) argues that shorter times promote intuitive thinking. Shorter times 
encourage instinctive and emotional decisions rooted in prior knowledge, experience 
and default belief. Meanwhile, longer times promote rational thinking. Longer times 
encourage a more careful assessment of each situation. This technique has been used 
to study decisions related to consumer behavior, time preferences and cooperation 
(Piovesan & Wengström, 2009). 
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illustrates the general findings of this paper. Moreover, this first paper provides 
a starting point for the methodological approach followed in the present study 
and conveys evidence that decisions made under “time pressure” experience 
higher levels of contribution than those in “time delay”.  
Considering the evidence of the first paper, Tinghög et al. (2013) replicate 
the study in four different experiments without confirming the initial findings. 
The four replications include one prisoner’s dilemma (#1) and three public 
good games (#2 to #4) shown in Figure 2. Additionally, with the objective to 
minimize missing values10, the replication evaluated the decisions to cooperate 
as binary decisions. More importantly, and, in contrast to the former findings, 
this second paper does not find causal effects of time on the rates of 
cooperation: Humans do not reflect systematic tendencies towards altruism or 
selfishness as a function of time. Despite this evidence, Rand et al. (2013) 
discusses the differences in the experimental designs (between their first study 
and Tinghög’s replication) that could vary the findings.  
 
Figure 1 
Thinking intuitively promotes cooperation 
Source: Figure taken from Rand et al. (2012) 
Accordingly, the aforementioned study contributes to the present research 
in two key aspects. First, it improves the specification of the empirical strategy: 
it assesses the decision to cooperate as a binary choice (i.e. 
cooperates=1/deflects=0). Second, it provides empirical evidence that 
contrasts the first paper, motivating the discussion about this type of research. 
 
                                                 
10 More specifically, the choice is set as “0” if the contribution to the pot is less than 
the money kept privately, and, the choice is set as “1” if the contribution to the pot is 
higher than the money that is kept privately.  
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Figure 2 
Replications on intuitive cooperation 
 
Source: Figure taken from Tinghög et al. (2013) 
 
Considering its initial findings, Rand et al. (2014) analyze the evidence of 
time-pressure and time-delayed responses on 15 different experimental studies 
over a period of two-years. In these studies, the researchers find that pressure 
increases in 21 pp the likelihood to cooperate. Thus, this evidence suggests that 
selfishness increases in time. In addition, this paper proposes the Social 
Heuristic Hypothesis which theorizes that intuition would tend to be more 
cooperative (than rational behaviors) in those situations where selfishness is 
the optimal strategy for an individual. However, the individual would readjust 
his/her default decision to match the best-self-interested strategy as thinking 
time increases. Furthermore, Rand et al. (2014) discuss that intuition could 
have stronger effects on cooperation in societies where is advantageous to 
cooperate in daily life activities. Thus, this paper also proposes that experience 
could act as a further mechanism. Therefore, this paper contributes in two 
ways to the current research; first, it conveys additional evidence on the 
questions of the present analysis; and second, it improves the understanding of 
the decision-making processes underpinning human cooperation.  
Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014) develop a further study on the topic. 
The researchers recreate eight different PPGs. Four experiments manipulate 
the knowledge about the contributions of the other participants (known or 
unknown), the identity of the other participants (humans or computer) and the 
limits on time to decide (time pressure or time delay). The first four lines of 
Figure 3 show these results. Additionally, four other tests evaluate the role of 
participants’ experience (Experiments 2 (a,b,c) and Experiment 3 in Figure 3). 
Interestingly, the results of all eight experiments did not find any clear effect of 
time on human behavior. More importantly, the combined effect (of the eight 
experiments) does not reflect a statistically significant effect of time (last line of 
Figure 3). Considering this evidence, this paper is consider to be of significant 
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importance to expand the evidence of the relationship between thinking time, 
human cooperation and social behavior.  
Figure 3 
Mean difference between time-pressured and  
time-delayed conditions 
Note: The grey lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the (mean) difference between 
time-pressured and time-delayed decisions. The last row reflects the combined effect of all eight 
experiments. All lines show no clear influence of time on human cooperation. 
Source: Figure taken from Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014)     
Likewise, Nielsen et al. (2014) study a large-scale PPG. Based on 
participant’s behavior, the paper classifies them as free riders, conditional 
cooperators and other cooperators11. As shown in Figure 4, the results suggest 
that free riders require more time to reach a decision when compared to the 
other participants. The study argues that conditional cooperation is seen as a 
social norm and, therefore, free riders need additional time to solve a moral 
dilemma: to preserve the norm of cooperation (despite their personal cost) or 
refuse cooperation (following their best self-interested strategy). In this sense, 
free riders experience “second thoughts”, leading them to free ride on the 
generosity of the others. Hence, Nielsen et al. (2014) is important to provide 
                                                 
11 “Free riders” comprise those participants that do not contribute to the public pot. 
“Conditional cooperators” gathers those participants that increase contributors after 
other participants contribute first. Thus, they become cooperators “conditional” on 
the cooperation of others. Finally, “other cooperators” include all other participants 
who always contribute independently of the decisions of the other participants.  
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additional evidence supporting the findings of the initial study and to identify 
the vast recent literature developed in this nascent field of research.  
Furthermore, Recalde et al. (2014), and more recently Recalde et al. (2015), 
publish two other studies on this matter. These papers readjusts the dominant 
strategy of the PGGs to account for human error and confusion when making 
decisions (“clicking”) in laboratory settings. Their results propose that the 
increase in cooperation and generosity (of the time-pressured treatment) is a 
consequence of confusion as participants are severely hurried to “click” fast. 
Thus, the difference is not a consequence of innate generosity to other 
members, but because of mistake. Therefore, these two papers are important 
to outline the existing limitations of laboratory experiments when researching 
on these questions.   
Figure 4 
Response times per classification of participants 
 
Note: Boxplots of response time of participants. The white line of the box plot displays  
the mean.           
Source: Figure taken from Nielsen et al. (2014) 
 
Considering the mixed literature from laboratory experiments, the present 
study designs a natural experiment in the field. A natural field experiment is 
preferred for two general reasons. First, it assesses the behavior of participants 
in more truthful manners. Second, it minimizes the likelihood of human error 
and confusion. More importantly, based on the knowledge and the research 
that the author has conducted, there are no studies assessing dual-reasoning in 
a natural field experiment on human cooperation at the moment of the 
elaboration of this research paper. 
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2.3 Beyond the lab: advantages of natural experiments for 
social research 
Natural experiments provide an ideal technique to examine individual and 
social behavior. List (2007) mentions that natural experiments evaluate more 
truthful responses as participants are not aware that their decisions are being 
assessed. Thus, they reveal enriched and more honest responses than those 
responses made in artificial atmospheres such as surveys, interviews or 
laboratory experiments. Additionally, natural experiments are able to minimize 
biases in the selection of participants if they are developed in appropriate 
locations. For all of these reasons, the results of natural experiments have 
external validity. (List, 2007; List, 2011; Stilgoe, 2012).  
Several studies use natural field experiments to research on charitable 
giving, norm enforcement, reputation and cooperation12. Two of these studies 
are particularly relevant for the present work. First, Balafoutas et al. (2012) 
studies the willingness to enforce two social efficiency-enhancing norms: the 
non-littering norm and the escalator’s norm13. Using actors to recreate the 
natural phenomenon, the researches violate these two social norms to examine 
the likeliness of people to enforce them. To minimize selection biases, the 
experiment took place in the central train station of Athens (Greece). In this 
sense, this first study is important to propose a clear methodological approach 
on natural field experiments and to give empirical evidence of the enforcement 
of social norms between strangers of a similar society.  
Second, Balafoutas et al. (2014) studies the propensities to punish 
individuals that violate social norms14. For this purpose, the study distinguishes 
between direct punishment and indirect punishment. In particular, while direct 
punishment comprises a direct rebuke on the norm-violator; indirect 
punishment reprimands him/her by withholding help that would have been 
given (without the violation of the social norm). Thus, this study is important 
for the present research in three ways. First, it improves the methodological 
strategy to undertake natural field experiments. Second, it identifies a second 
social behavior that would be interesting to include in the present research: 
(indirect) punishment. Third and last, it suggests the assessment of punitive 
behavior by breaking the non-littering norm.  
Based on the literature discussed in this chapter, the present study links 
methodologies used in natural and laboratory experiments to answer its 
fundamental questions. By doing so, this work bridges methodologies such as 
natural field experiments and response times with recent studies on human 
                                                 
12 Review List & Luck-Reiley (2002); Frey & Meier (2004); Falk (2004); Martin & 
Randal (2005); Yoeli et al. (2013); Alpizar et al. (2008); Shangan & Croson (2009); 
Zhang & Zhu (2010) and Karlan & McConnell (2014). 
13 The non-littering norm comprises the norm of “not polluting a public space”. The 
escalator norm involves the norm of “standing in the right and walking in the left of 
escalators”. 
14 Those individuals that fail to follow the norms of the society. 
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cooperation and dual-processes of human reasoning. The following section 
explains the empirical strategies used in the present research. 
3 Empirical strategy 
This chapter explains the three methodological strategies used in this study. 
The main strategy proposes a natural field experiment to examine the two 
processes of human reasoning in the decisions to cooperate with a public 
good. The second strategy comprises the confection of three surveys. The 
surveys have the purpose to record the results of the natural experiment and to 
obtain complementary information. The third strategy uses econometric 
analysis to evaluate the robustness of the experimental results and to analyze 
other potential mechanisms driving the results. 
3.1 Natural field experiment 
Considering the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the main strategy of the 
present research comprises a natural field experiment (NFE). The experiment 
assesses the influence of intuitive and rational thinking in the decisions to 
cooperate with a public good and to punish those individuals that fail to follow 
the norms of the society. For this purpose, the experiment exposes participants 
to two naturally occurring social dilemmas. This section clarifies the design and 
features of the NFE.  
Recreating social dilemmas: decisions to cooperate and punish 
The natural field experiment recreates a helping-norm to test the decisions to 
cooperate. The experiment recreates the helping-norm by asking an actor to 
“unnoticeably” drop one glove (as shown in Annex A: photos #1 & #2). In 
this way, the experiment is able to approximate the decisions to cooperate to a 
public good: All the community is better off if all of its members follow the 
norm of helping each other. Nevertheless, the time and effort to help gives 
incentives to deflect assistance and free ride on the cooperation of other 
members. 
A one glove-drop is carefully chosen for four reasons.15 First of all, it is 
well known to everybody the need to have the two gloves for a correct use, 
thus, dropping one glove is naturally perceived as a helping-norm. Second, the 
one glove-drop does not make any sound. This fact provides consistency and 
internal logic that the actor does not know that the glove has fallen. Third, 
gloves are big enough to be seen from the distance. This feature assures that 
participants of the experiment see the fall of the glove. Fourth, a glove does 
not comprise “high or low justifications” that could distort the decisions to 
                                                 
15 In preliminary pilots, the experiment used items such as books, fruits and other 
pieces of cloth. However, only (gym) gloves adjusted well to the experimental 
dynamics and provided consistency of summer time.  
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cooperate (or deflect). On one side, using an object with “high justification” 
(i.e. jewelry, cellphone or a wallet) would “morally force” the individuals to 
help or steal them. On the other side, using an object with “low justification” 
(i.e. pencil or sheets) may be considered as not a significant object, 
discouraging participants to help. The NFE avoids these two situations using 
gloves.  
Furthermore, the NFE proposes a violation of the non-littering norm to 
test the decisions to punish. Specifically, the experiment studies indirect 
punishment by asking the actor to litter before developing the helping-norm. 
In other words, the actor litters first (using an empty plastic bottle16) and then 
drops the glove. This condition is shown in Annex A: photo #3. More 
specifically, the research is able to assess indirect punishment by comparing the 
rates of cooperation in this social dilemma with the rates of cooperation of the 
initial helping-norm (pure-cooperation condition). Hence, it is possible to 
examine whether citizens tend to withhold help if an individual litters first, 
punishing the norm-violation for breaking the non-littering norm.  
Personnel 
Three personnel participate in the NFE: an actor, a participant and the 
researcher. The actor recreates the naturally occurring social dilemma (i.e. 
cooperation or indirect punishment). In the cooperation condition, the actor 
represents any given individual in the society that requires help. In the indirect 
punishment condition, the actor represents any norm-violator individual in 
society that requires help. Thus, actors allow the analysis and inference of the 
results at the societal-level. Lastly, the experiment selects an actor and an 
actress to analyze the potential influence of gender on the decisions to 
cooperate or punish.  
Furthermore, the participant is a citizen chosen at random whose behavior 
is to be assessed in the NFE. Each participant has the decision to cooperate or 
to deflect. The following Section 3.1.4 (“Experimental Procedure”) describes 
the characteristics that a participant needs to meet in order to be selected for 
the experiment. Finally, the researcher is in charge of the research team. The 
researcher has two main responsibilities:  (1) to verify that all experiments 
follow similar procedures and, (2) to record the experimental results after each 
trial. The personnel is shown in Annex A: photos #2. 
 
Location 
The location of the experiment is carefully selected in the main sidewalk of 
Park Malieveld in The Hague (NL) because of five reasons. First, every 
individual walking in the sidewalk crosses the Park. By definition, each 
participant has to make a decision to cooperate (or deflect) if a helping-norm is 
developed along the way. Assuming that the participants see the experiment, 
they do not have the option to skip or avoid this decision (see Annex A: 
                                                 
16 Balaoufas et al. (2014) uses a similar object.  
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photos #1 to #5). Second, this location eliminates reciprocity effects and social 
pressures (as explained in the following section “Experimental Procedure” 
3.1.4), allowing participants to make private and anonymous decisions (see 
Annex A: photos #1 to #9). Third, as there is no reason to expect that the 
population walking on the Park would be different from an average resident of 
The Hague, this location minimizes selection biases. In particular, Park 
Malieveld is located in front of the main Central Train Station of The Hague 
and, it is surrounded by many learning institutes, university faculties, 
commercial businesses and non-governmental organizations. Fourth, this 
location increases the visual awareness, attention and focus of the participants 
as the main sidewalk is surrounded by trees and open grass fields (see Annex 
A: photos #6 to #9). Fifth, average human walking time can be used as a 
convenient parameter to encourage intuitive and rational thinking on the 
decisions to cooperate or punish (see Annex A: photos #1 to #3). 
Figure 5 
Treatments encouraging intuitive and rational thinking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where,  
Point A indicates the location where the actor creates the social dilemma.  
Point B. From Point A, it is measured 4.5 m from the direction in which the participant comes 
to encourage intuitive decisions.  
Point C.  From Point A, it is measured 13 m in the direction in which the participant comes to 
encourage rational decisions.  
Source: author’s design. 
 
The NFE uses average human walking time to encourage intuitive and 
rational decisions. As suggested in many Dutch and international studies, two 
time-distance thresholds calibrate an average human walking time in using 1.3 
m/s (Boonstra et al. 1993; TranSafety, 1997; Levine et al. 1999; Browning et al. 
2006; Mohler et al. 2007; Dongen & Heck et al. 2008). First, a “time-
pressured” threshold is established 4.5 m away from the actor to encourage 
intuitive decisions. These decisions will be taken in around 3.5 s. Second, a 
“time-delayed” threshold is delimited 13 m away from the actor to encourage 
rational decisions. These decisions will be taken in around 10 s. Figure 5 
displays the different designs used in the analysis.  
Point A Point B Point C 
Short time-distance (4.5m) ~ 3.5 (8.5) ~ 6.5s 
Long time-distance (13m ~ 10s) 
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The helping-norm is recreated at either of the two “time-distance” 
thresholds. First, the actor waits at Point A for a participant to get close to one 
of the two “time-distance” thresholds. Point B and Point C comprise a short 
and long “time-distance” thresholds. In other words, they represent the “time-
pressured” and “time-delayed” decisions, respectively. Second, at either of 
these points, the actor recreates the helping-norm and faces the open fields of 
the Park. This eliminates social pressures and reciprocity effects on the 
decision of the participant. Annex A, Photos #1 & #2 show these treatments 
in the NFE. 
The indirect punishment has a particular distinction. In this condition, the 
actor violates the non-littering norm before the participant reaches Point B or 
Point C, recreating the helping norm at the actual threshold (Point B or Point 
C). As an example, if the experiment is assessing the short time-distance 
treatment, the actor would litter before the participant reaches Point B and 
then, the actor drops the glove at Point B. This is shown in Annex A: Photo 
#3.  
Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure provides consistency among all trials. Each of the 
experiments started with the actor sitting in a bench close to Point A. 
Meanwhile, the researcher was located in the opposite side of the preceding 
bench. This ensured no interference with the experiment, avoided social 
pressures on the participant and increased the observability of the researcher 
(see Annex A: photo #2).  
Two bicycles were situated on the opposite site of the sidewalk to improve 
the visual consistency of the event. Bicycle #1 was located in front of the actor 
at Point A and Bicycle #2 marked the threshold of the treatment condition. 
Thus, the second bicycle stablished the “time-pressure” or “time-delay” 
condition (short-long, respectably). Moreover, the actor holds the glove/plastic 
bottle in a bag to recreate one of the two social dilemmas. This is shown in 
Annex A: photo #1 & #2. 
Each trial began with the selection of a participant. There were three main 
features to categorize a participant as convenient. First, he/she needed to be 
alone and with no other subjects walking in the opposite direction or close to 
him/her. This eliminates social pressures. Second, the actor and the participant 
cannot be known to each other. This eliminates reciprocity pressures. 
Considering these two features, each participant developed private and 
anonymous decisions. Third, the participant had to be attentive and not visibly 
(walking) in rush. Annex A, Photos #4 & #5 evidence a typical participant of 
the experiment.  
A cooperation treatment and a male actor are assumed to describe the rest 
of the experimental procedure. In the first step of the experiment, the actor 
leaves the bench and walks towards Bicycle #1, waiting for the participant to 
reach Point B or Point C (based on the treatment condition marked by Bicycle 
#2). In the second step, the actor recreates the helping-norm by 
“unnoticeably” dropping one glove when trying to put it in his bag. As he 
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continues walking, the actor reaches the end of the sidewalk facing Bicycle #1, 
pretending to look for the keys of the bike or to make a phone call (see Annex 
A: photos #1 to #3). In the third step, the actor waits until the participant 
reveals the decision to cooperate (or deflect) at Point A. Importantly enough, 
the actor does not respond to any voice alerts far from Point A. Instead, the 
actor awaits for an immediate physical contact or a voice alert behind him at 
Point A (see Annex A: photos #10 to #12). This ensures that each participant 
answers at the same threshold and he/she needs time and effort to help the 
actor.  In the last step of the experiment, once the participant has made a 
decision at Point A, the researcher collects the results and the actor (follows 
and) interviews the participant, asking for additional individual characteristics 
(see Annex A: Photos #13 & #14). 
Each participant had as much time to make a decision as his/her walking 
time allows, but restrained by the distance. While the short time-distance 
encourages intuitive thinking through faster decisions, the long time-distance 
encourages rational thinking through slower decisions. More importantly, as 
participants are randomly assigned to the treatments conditions, the study is 
able to assess the average differences in the rates of cooperation or punishment 
between these two conditions.   
Experimental treatments 
The natural field experiment can be summarized in three dimensions of two 
treatments each. The first dimension comprises the social dilemma, 
distinguishing among the cooperation and the indirect punishment conditions. 
The second dimension involves the dual-reasoning treatments, encouraging 
intuitive and rational decisions. The third and last dimension denotes the 
gender of the actors (male and female). Table 2 summarizes these categories. 
Table 2 
Dimensions and treatments of natural field experiment 
Social dilemmas Dual-reasoning Gender 
Cooperation 
(helping-norm) 
Short time-distance 
(Time pressured) 
Female, Male Indirect punishment 
(non-littering norm  
followed by helping-norm) 
Long time-distance 
(Time delayed) 
Source: author’s design. 
Testing the research questions 
The NFE randomly assigns participants across treatments to answer the 
research questions. This fact prevents any systematical predisposition of their 
specific characteristics. Thus, by comparing the propensities to cooperate in 
both “time-distance” treatments, it is possible to answer whether the citizens 
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of The Hague are naturally predisposed towards altruism or selfishness and 
whether they shift their default behaviors with more thinking time.  
Each social dilemma is analyzed independently. On one side, the analysis 
of the cooperation dilemma compares the propensities to cooperate in the 
“short treatment” with the “long” treatment. A positive difference indicates 
that the citizens of The Hague are predisposed towards altruism and 
cooperation, but behave more selfishly with more time to think. A negative 
difference suggests that they are selfish by nature, behaving more cooperative 
in time. On the other side, the analysis of the indirect punishment dilemma has 
to compare its propensities to cooperate with the (initial) rates in the short 
treatment of the cooperation dilemma. This approximates the mean propensity 
to withhold help as a consequence of the breaking the non-littering norm.  
3.2 Surveys 
Three additional surveys are applied to complement the results of the main 
strategy17. The first survey collects the results from each NFE. For this 
purpose, the experimental survey is divided into three sections (see Annex B: 
survey B1). The first section acknowledges the conditions of the experiment, 
distinguishing the treatments under analysis. The second section registers the 
decisions of the participants, discerning between “cooperates” and “deflects”. 
Also, this second section assesses their helping behavior (i.e., “the participant 
touches the actor and points the glove”). The third section collects specific 
demographic characteristics of each participant such as age, gender, time lived 
in The Netherlands, willingness to undertake risks in daily life, height and other 
personal characteristics. Thus, this information is asked to each participant in a 
quick and informal interview after the NFE is over (see Annex A: photos #13 
& #14).  
Two other surveys are applied to ask other individuals what they would do 
if were hypothetically exposed to the NFE. Thus, these surveys assess different 
individuals from the participants of the NFE. As shown in Annex B: survey B2 
& B3, one survey studies cooperation (B2) and the other examines indirect 
punishment (B3). Each survey is applied to 20 people, for a total of 40 data 
points. Additionally, both surveys included one experimental exercise, dividing 
two particular questions among 10 people per survey. While one version of the 
question inquired on the influence of time-pressured decisions (on 10 
respondents out of the 20 per survey), the other version inquired on the 
influence of time-delayed decisions on the other half of the sample (the other 
10 respondents per survey). Both surveys are collected in Park Malieveld.  
3.3 Econometric specification 
The econometric specification combines modeling features from previous 
empirical studies with the characteristics of the current NFE. Assuming 
dichotomous dependent variables (cooperates or deflects) and the randomized 
                                                 
17 The three surveys are presented in Annex B.  
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nature of the data, it is suitable to adopt a linear probability model18. The 
model is specified in the present section.  
The vector  defines the dependent variable. For both cooperation and 
indirect punishment treatments,  comprises a dichotomous variable with 
the participants’ decision to cooperate ( ) or deflect ( . In 
addition, a “Time-Distance” dummy (  and three demographic covariates 
( ) comprise the explanatory variables. The “Time-Distance” dummy 
comprises a dichotomous variable of the participants’ exposure to the “long 
treatment” ( , representing rational decisions) and to the “short 
treatment” ( , representing intuitive decisions). Moreover, the (first) 
survey ex-post experiment captures the three demographic characteristics 
included in the specification of the model: age, gender and a dummy 
accounting for most life lived in The Netherlands (NL).  Lastly, a vector  is 
included to account for random disturbances. Therefore, the specification can 
be modelled as: 
 
 
 
Where,  
 = 1, if subject chooses to cooperate, 0 if subject deflects.  
 = 1, if subject is exposed to the long treatment, 0 if exposed to the short treatment. 
,  includes covariates of age, gender and most time lived in The Netherlands.  
, disturbance term. 
 
The magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the “Time-distance” 
coefficient provides the main results of this strategy. First, the magnitude 
indicates the size of the influence of rational decisions ( ) on the average 
propensities to cooperate. Second, the sign indicates the direction of the 
influence. A positive sign would imply a natural human inclination to act 
selfishly, increasing cooperation with more rational decisions. Meanwhile, a 
negative sign would imply a natural human inclination towards cooperation, 
increasing selfish behavior with more rational decisions. Third, the “Time-
distance” coefficient will be statistically significant if it has a p-value below 
10%, implying a causal effect of the variable on the decisions to cooperate of 
the population under analysis.  
The interpretation of the “Time-distance” coefficient shifts between social 
dilemmas. The interpretation is straightforward in the cooperation treatment, 
interpreting the coefficient as the effect of rational thinking on the propensity 
to cooperate.  However, the interpretation shifts in the indirect punishment 
treatment, as the coefficient only analyzes the difference in the rates of 
cooperation between “short” and “long” treatments. In this case, the 
                                                 
18 Rand et al. (2012), Balaoufas (2012), Rand et al. (2014) and Balaoufas et al. (2014) 
used this approach. 
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interpretation needs to include the initial (indirect) penalty shown by the 
difference between the constants of both social dilemmas.  
Furthermore, the econometric analysis includes two robustness tests to 
check the consistency of the estimations. The first test contrasts the measure 
of willingness to undertake daily-risks and height levels of the participants with 
their propensities to cooperate. Thus, this test evaluates potential effects of risk 
attitudes and height levels on the decision to cooperate and punish. The 
second test19 interacts a risk-dummy variable divided by its sample average 
(risk-attitude above mean=1, risk-attitude below mean=0) and contrasts it to 
the “time-distance” condition. By doing this, the test verifies any displacing 
effects of risk-taking and risk-averse individuals on their decisions to cooperate 
and punish.  
4 Data 
This chapter describes the data gathered in three sections. The first section 
outlines the characteristics of the data collection process. The second section 
summarizes the number of observations per treatment. The third section 
displays the demographic statistics of the participants in the sample. 
Furthermore, this chapter supports the main findings presented in chapter 5. 
4.1 Data collection 
The research team collected the data during the summer of 2015. Specifically, 
the NFE was performed three times a week for around 3 to 5 hours per day. 
This strategy avoids both the repetition of participants and that all the potential 
participants become aware of the research. Moreover, the treatments were 
randomly assigned independently of day, hour and climate. Table 3 displays the 
main features of the data collection.  
Table 3 
Characteristics of data collection 
Criteria Description 
Data 267 experimental trials & 40 surveys. 
Period July 6th to August 7th, 2015 
Location Park Malieveld, The Hague (NL). 
Actors (2) Female and male. 
Days and hours Week days between 10am and 5pm; 2 or 3 days per week. 
Climate All conditions, except raining or very low temperature. 
Source: data gathered by author. 
                                                 
19 A third placebo checks for similar interactions of height levels. However, such test 
is not further discussed as its interpretability is not fully clear on the results of this 
experiment.  
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4.2 Data sample 
The complete sample comprises 267 participants. Of this full set, 8.2% rejected 
visual contact with the experiment20 (or were not able to answer the survey to 
confirm it21, n1: 19). To recognize the importance of observing the experiment, 
the data is divided in two samples sets. The “Full sample” comprises the 
complete set (N1: 267). The “Acknowledged sample” includes only those 
participants that did not reject to see the experiment (N2: 248). Figure 6 
displays the number of observations per treatment22. 
Figure 6 
Number of observations per sample type 
 
Notes: Blue represents the treatment encouraging “intuitive decisions”.  
Red represents the treatment encouraging “rational decisions”.  
4.3 Demographic statistics 
The demographic statistics of the participants indicate that the experiment 
comprise a representative sample of the citizens of The Hague23. They display a 
mean age of 44 years with 68% ranging between 30 and 58 years old. The 
sample presents considerable gender balance although is slightly leaning to 
males (61%). In terms of height, participants have an average height of 175 cm 
whereas only 5% range below 155 cm or above 195 cm.  Around 68% have a 
general risk-taking attitude between 3.9 and 7.6 points. Also, as expected from 
such an international environment as The Hague, participants have a high 
                                                 
20 Participants could reject visual contact to avoid feelings of shame and guilt (social 
pressures) even if they did see the experiment.   
21 Were not willing to answer or did not speak English, Spanish or Greek. Also, 3% 
was not willing to be surveyed despite deciding to cooperate (n2: 8). 
22 Assuming : 5% and big sample conditions (n≥30) per treatment, the 
data sample satisfies the specification for significant differences in proportions.  
23 Importantly, the survey ex-post experiment ask this information to each participant. 
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spread in the years lived in The Netherlands.  Finally, these statistics remain 
systematically balanced across treatments. Table 4 displays the demographics 
statistics of the Full Sample. 
Table 4 
Demographic statistics of full sample 
Variable Obs. Mean P-value Δ 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Age 234 43.77 0.564 13.969 15 76 
Male (=1, Female=0) 267 61% 0.294 0.488     
Most years lived in The 
Netherlands (=1, Other=0) 
236 82% 0.866 0.386     
Height 230 175.32 0.456 10.769 147 204 
Years lived in  
The Netherlands 234 37.74 0.704 20.381 0.008 76 
 
Willingness to undertake risk 233 5.744 0.442 1.85 0 10 
 
5 Results 
This chapter presents the results of the study. For this purpose, the chapter is 
divided in four sections. The first section presents the main findings, 
separating between unconditional results and conditional on the gender of the 
actor. The second section analyzes the results of the two surveys that 
hypothetically exposed (other) subjects to the NFE. The third section 
examines the robustness of the main results. 
5.1 Main findings 
Unconditional results 
The unconditional results provide strong evidence that the citizens of The 
Hague are naturally inclined to cooperate, behaving more selfishly as time to 
think increases. In the cooperation treatment, participants show a propensity 
to cooperate close to 71 pp in the short condition, reducing the propensity to 
around 51 pp in the long condition. In other words, participants show a natural 
and innate predisposition towards altruism, helping strangers in a spontaneous 
and instinctive manner. However, when participants had more time to think, 
they outweighed their personal cost of helping versus their moral obligations 
of preserving the helping-norm. Hence, the difference of 20 pp in favor of the 
short treatment provides clear evidence that participants become more selfish 
in time. Figure 7 displays the main results for both the Full sample and the 
Acknowledged sample.  
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Figure 7 
Unconditional propensities to cooperate per treatment 
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Notes:  Blue represents the propensities to cooperate in “intuitive decisions”.  
Red represents the propensities to cooperate in “rational decisions”.  
 implies the propensities to punish indirectly in short and long treatments, respectably.  
 
In the indirect punishment treatment, the results indicate that the citizens 
of The Hague have a natural inclination to punish norm-violators, increasing 
the penalty in time. This fact can be observed by comparing the rates of 
cooperation in the punishment dilemma to the (initial) rates in the short 
condition of the cooperation dilemma. In Figure 7, “ ” indicates the net 
effect of the indirect punishment under intuitive and rational decisions. In 
particular, participants demonstrated an instinctive punishment close to 20 pp, 
increasing the refusal to help to around 35 pp as time to think increases.  
Conditional on gender of actor 
The main findings remain consistent independently of the gender of the 
individual that develops the social dilemma. In particular, the propensities to 
cooperate remain around 72 pp for both the actor and the actress, decreasing 
the likelihood to around 52 pp when participants engage in more rational 
thinking. Hence, the evidence supports that independently of the gender of the 
individual in help, the citizens of The Hague are naturally predisposed to 
cooperate, but they behave more selfishly in time. Figure 8 displays the results 
for the Full sample24.  
 
                                                 
24 The Full Sample is chosen for clarity of the graph. As shown in Figure 7, the values 
do not vary much between Full and Acknowledged Samples. 
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Figure 8 
Propensities to cooperate conditional on gender of actor 
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Notes: Blue represents the propensities to cooperate in “intuitive decisions”.  
Red represents the propensities to cooperate in “rational decisions”. IP_(S,L ) implies the 
propensities to punish indirectly in short and long treatments, respectably. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the citizens of The Hague are innately 
predisposed to withhold help to both genders of norm-violators. In addition, 
the citizens increase the penalty when engaging in more rational thinking. For 
both the actor and the actress, the results indicate that participants are 
predisposed to punish indirectly by about 20 pp, increasing the penalty close to 
35 pp when they had more time to think.  
Effectiveness of treatments 
The application of the social dilemmas and the dual-reasoning treatments are 
successful and effective to meet the proposed goals. Regarding the social 
dilemmas, the participants clearly enforced the norm of helping strangers of 
the community, as the experimental results observe high rates of cooperation. 
Moreover, and as expected from the work of Balaoufas et al. (2014), 
participants reduced the propensity to help as an indirect punishment to norm-
violators25. As mentioned in the previous section, the propensity to cooperate 
decreases between 20 pp and 35 pp when the actor/actress littered first. 
 
                                                 
25 Many participants directly expressed their unwillingness to help because of the 
initial violation of the non-littering norm. They stated expressions such as: “Yes, I 
refused to help just because you littered first. We do not do that in this country”.  
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Figure 9 
Participants’ revealed difficulty of decision per treatments 
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The survey ex-post experiment also supports an effective encouragement 
of “intuitive and rational thinking”. One particular question of this survey 
inquired each participant about the level of difficulty of his/her decision (see 
Annex B: section B1, question C10.). As observed in Figure 9, participants 
made easier decisions in the treatments that encouraged “intuitive thinking”26 
and experienced an average higher difficulty in the treatment that encouraged 
“rational thinking”. For instance, the option “Not at all” comprises more than 
60% of the participants in the shorter version, but is reduced to around 25% in 
the longer version. Meanwhile, the relationship strengthens when comparing 
between social dilemmas. Participants exposed to the indirect punishment 
dilemma expressed a higher mean difficulty than those exposed to the 
cooperation dilemma. For instance, the option “Quite a lot” becomes the 
preferred alternative in the punitive dilemma, ranging between 35% in the 
short version to almost 50% in the long version.  
Helping behaviors 
The ways in which participants helped provide additional information on the 
processes of decision making and social behavior. The study examines five 
specific helping-behaviors. First, attitudes of “hesitation” and “looking 
around” are analyzed prior to decision making. Second, the study distinguished 
two particular ways of helping the actors: “physical contact and pointing 
glove” or, “bending over, picking glove and giving it back”. These helping- 
                                                 
26 Many participants explained their decisions as instinctive, unexpected and innate 
behaviors. For instance, some expressed phrases such as: “It was an instinctive 
reaction”, “Actually, I did not have time to think, I just did it” and “It was a simple 
decision to me”.  
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behaviors are shown in Annex A, Photos #10 & #11. Finally, the “voice alert 
and pointing glove” action is analyzed as an ex-ante behavior and as a way to 
help the actor. Figure 10 displays the results across treatments. 
Figure 10 
Helping-behaviors per treatments 
 
The cooperation dilemma displays relatively stable helping behaviors 
across dual-reasoning treatments. In terms of the short and long conditions, 
the most repeated helping behavior is “touching actor and pointing glove” 
(more than 60%) and the most costly helping attitude is “bending over, picking 
up and giving back” (performed in at least 20% of the cases). Interestingly 
enough, the propensity to undertake the latter decreases about 8p.p in the long 
treatment, supporting an increase in selfishness as “rational thinking” takes 
over.  
Conversely, the indirect punishment dilemma displays curious variations in 
the helping behavior. The results suggests that in average, the citizens of The 
Hague pay a lower personal cost when helping a norm-violator. For instance, 
while “physical contact and pointing” decreases about 20p.p when compared 
to the cooperation dilemma, “voice alert and pointing” duplicates to comprise 
about 60% of them. Interestingly, “bending over, picking up and giving back” 
was relatively stable across all treatments. This fact suggests that around 25% 
of the citizens of The Hague have an innate urgency to help strangers by 
paying the full personal cost (and despite a norm-violation). 
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5.2 Surveys 
The present section analyses the results of the surveys that hypothetically 
exposed respondents27 to the NFE. Initially, they were asked about their 
motivation to cooperate in both social dilemmas (see first two questions in 
Annex B, sections B2 & B3). The results of the cooperation survey suggest a 
slight positive association of shorter time-distances with higher help. For 
instance, while 100% of respondents chose “Yes, I am sure” and “Most 
probably yes” in the shorter version; their motivations decline in the long 
version to include 20% in “Most probably not”28. In practice, the respondents 
associated the decisions of the shorter treatment with more physical reactions 
and the longer ones with more carefully analyzed behaviors. The participants 
also recognized that the costs of helping, their moral obligations and the 
physical characteristics of the individual could play a crucial role in the decision 
to cooperate or not. Figure 11 displays these results. 
The results of the indirect punishment survey suggest that respondents 
reduce the motivation to help norm-violators. For instance, while the short 
version gathers 30% of responses in the two negative options, more than half 
of the respondents acknowledges a partial or complete unwillingness to help in 
the long treatment (60%).  
Furthermore, respondents are asked whether quicker or delayed decisions 
could influence their answers (see third question in Annex sections B2 & B3). 
The results show a slight indication that quicker decisions are positively 
associated with higher rates of cooperation.  However, the evidence is not 
conclusive enough. For instance, while the cooperation dilemma displays a 
difference of 30 pp in the two positive motivations (“Most probably yes” and 
“Yes, I am sure”), the negative alternatives do not have any real differences 
(20% each). Likewise, respondents do not display clear patterns in the case of 
indirect punishment. Figure 12 displays these results. 
                                                 
27 The respondents of these surveys should not be any different from the average 
citizen of The Hague: average age (37.5 years), time lived in NL (25.7 years), days 
going to Park Malieveld (less than twice a week) and gender (males: 58%).  
28 Notice that no respondent expressed a complete unwillingness to help (i.e. “No, I 
would not”). This demonstrates how social pressures influence responses in artificial 
instruments when comparing with the rates of deflection from the real natural 
experiment (section 5.1). 
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Figure 11 
Survey: motivation to help per treatments 
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Figure 12 
Surveys: influence of time on cooperation per treatments 
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Despite the tendency suggested by the results, the surveys do not provide 
convincing and clear evidence to answer the research questions of this study. 
In particular, the results indicate very high motivations to cooperate that do 
not match with the actual helping rates obtained in the natural field 
experiment. This fact illustrates why the questions of the current research 
cannot be assessed using artificial instruments such as surveys, as the latter do 
not avoid social pressures. Instead, it is a more reliable and suitable strategy to 
analyze the results of the natural field experiment. As a consequence, the 
following section checks the robustness of the initial results of the NFE.  
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5.3 Robustness and mechanisms 
This section examines the sensitivity of the main results with regard to the 
observable characteristics of the participants. Given the randomized treatment 
status, point estimates should be stable across models.  Standard errors or the 
precision of estimates may be improved by decreasing residual variance. In 
addition, this section examines heterogeneous treatment effects through the 
interaction of the treatment status with observable characteristics. For instance, 
are riskier people more or less inclined to cooperate and punish under time 
pressure? 
Cooperation treatment 
The econometric analysis confirms that the citizens of The Hague are 
intuitively predisposed to help, but behave more selfishly when they have more 
time to think. Participants demonstrate an innate propensity to cooperate of 
about 72 pp in both samples. However, the propensities decrease by around 18 
pp when participants have more time to think, becoming about ½ and ¼ of 
the decisions. Importantly, the causal effect remains stable after including 
observable characteristics. Table 5 displays the results.  
Table 5 
Cooperation estimates 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.192* -0.183* -0.207* -0.178* -0.169* -0.194* 
(0.082) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.086) (0.084) 
Age 
  
0.005 
  
0.005 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
Male 
(=1, female=0)   
0.089 
  
0.096 
  
(0.090) 
  
(0.090) 
Country most lived in 
(The Netherlands=1, other=0)   
0.105 
  
0.110 
  
(0.116) 
  
(0.116) 
Constant 0.714** 0.742** 0.391* 0.742** 0.738** 0.398* 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.162) (0.054) (0.055) (0.163) 
N 137 125 125 128 123 123 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic covariates      X      X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Two robustness checks confirm the consistency of the results. The 
simpler placebo test suggests no significant spillovers of risk attitudes and 
height levels on the decisions of the participants (neither independently nor 
jointly). The “time-distance” coefficient remains close to ½ of the mean 
propensity. The stronger placebo test finds spillovers of risk attitudes over the 
40 
 
sample. However, the combined effects of the interaction term and the “time-
distance” coefficient preserve the negative and casual effect of the latter 
variable. Annex C displays these results in Tables 9 and 10 respectively.  
The results remain consistent per gender of the actor. On one side, a 
stranger that has more time to think would avoid cooperating with a female 
individual by roughly 20 pp. Nonetheless, the age of the stranger would 
increase the likelihood to cooperate by 12pp for every 10 years older (around 
50% of the mean propensity). On the other side, having more time to think 
reduces the likelihood of a stranger to help a male individual by 21 pp. 
Conversely, if a stranger has lived most of his/her life in The Netherlands, the 
likelihood to cooperate increases by 46 pp (i.e., about 90% of the mean 
propensity). Thus, the results suggest that experience with the norms of the 
Dutch society also play a role in the decisions to cooperate. These estimates are 
displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Cooperation estimates per gender of actor 
Variables 
Female Male 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.176 
(0.12) 
-0.224* 
(0.11) 
-0.147 
(0.12) 
-0.208+ 
(0.11) 
-0.207+ 
(0.12) 
-0.192 
(0.11) 
-0.209+ 
(0.12) 
-0.185 
(0.12) 
Age  
0.013** 
(0.00) 
 
0.012** 
(0.00) 
 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
 
-0.004 
(0.00) 
Male 
(= 1, female=0) 
 
0.131 
(0.12) 
 
0.144 
(0.12) 
 
0.04 
(0.13) 
 
0.037 
(0.13) 
Country most lived 
in 
(The Netherlands=1, 
Other=0 ) 
 
-0.172 
(0.16) 
 
-0.165 
(0.16) 
 
0.459**(
0.16) 
 
0.460** 
(0.16)     
Constant 
0.706 
(0.08) 
0.248 
(0.2) 
0.727** 
(0.08) 
0.261 
(0.22) 
0.722** 
(0.08) 
0.501* 
(0.22) 
0.758** 
(0.08) 
0.512* 
(0.22) 
N 68 64 64 63 69 61 64 60 
Sample Full Acknowledged Full Acknowledged 
Demographic cov.    X    X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Indirect punishment treatment 
The econometric analysis also confirms that the citizens of The Hague are 
predisposed to punish norm-violators, increasing the penalty in time. The 
mean propensity to cooperate decrease from 71 pp in cooperation dilemma to 
around 50 pp in the indirect punishment dilemma. This difference implies an 
innate penalty of around 20 pp. More importantly, the results suggest that 
more time to think has a positive causal effect on the decisions to punish. For 
instance, participants exposed to the “long” version withhold help by an 
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additional 16 pp (between ½ and ¼ of the mean decisions), suggesting a total 
penalty close to 35 pp when citizens have more time to think. These results are 
shown in Table 7 (in the following page).  
Two robustness tests check the reliability of these estimations. A 
simpler test finds no independent or joint spill-overs of risk attitude or height 
levels on the decisions to cooperate. Likewise, the stronger test does not find 
any statistically significant influence of risk-attitudes above and below the 
sample mean driving the estimations. Nonetheless, the “time-distance” 
coefficient losses statistical significance. Tables 12 and 13 in Annex C display 
the results of these tests. 
 
Table 7 
Indirect punishment estimates 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.136 -0.170+ -0.175+ -0.133 -0.163+ -0.172+ 
(0.086) (0.095) (0.095) (0.091) (0.096) (0.096) 
Age   
0.001 
  
0.001 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
Male 
(=1, female=0) 
  
-0.176+ 
  
-0.171+ 
  
(0.099) 
  
(0.100) 
Country most lived in 
(The Netherlands=1, other=0) 
  
0.063 
  
0.050 
  
(0.133) 
  
(0.137) 
Constant 
0.484** 0.538** 0.557** 0.517** 0.538** 0.570** 
(0.063) (0.070) (0.191) (0.065) (0.070) (0.194) 
N 130 109 109 120 108 108 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic cov.   X   X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Furthermore, the results suggest a slight variation per gender of the actor. 
On one side, a stranger exposed to the long treatment would decrease help by 
around 17 pp if dealing with a female norm-violator. On the other side, a 
stranger would decrease help by about 10 pp if a male norm-violator is 
involved in the situation. Nonetheless, these coefficients lose statistical 
significance. More interestingly, the study finds a strong and positive causal 
effect of male strangers punishing other male norm-violators by an extra 26 pp. 
Table 8 displays these estimations.  
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Table 8 
Indirect punishment estimates per actor gender 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Time-distance  
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.146 -0.188 -0.167 -0.188 -0.129 -0.068 -0.1 -0.062 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
Age 
 
0.004 
(0.00) 
 
-0.004 
(0.00) 
 
0.009 
(0.01) 
 
0.009 
(0.01) 
Male  
(= 1, female=0) 
 
-0.107) 
(0.14) 
 
-0.107 
(0.14) 
 
-0.267+ 
(0.14) 
 
-0.256+ 
(0.14) 
Country most lived 
in 
(The Netherlands=1, 
other=0)  
0.129 
(0.18)  
0.129 
(0.18)  
-0.032 
(0.19)  
-0.061 
(0.2) 
Constant 0.469** 
(0.09) 
0.640* 
(0.28) 
0.500** 
(0.09) 
0.640* 
(0.28) 
0.500** 
(0.09) 
0.348 
(0.3) 
0.533** 
(0.09) 
0.369 
(0.3) 
N 63 54 60 54 67 55 60 54 
Sample Full  Acknowledged Full Acknowledged 
Gender Female Male 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
6 Discussion of  results   
The present chapter discusses the results of the study in four sections. The first 
section compares the current findings with previous studies.  The second 
section explores several implications associated with the present results. The 
third and fourth sections outline opportunities for improvement and avenues 
for future research, respectably.   
6.1 Comparison of results with previous studies 
Analogous to Rand et al. (2012), Rand et al. (2014) and Neilsen et al. (2014), 
the present results find causal effect of thinking time on human cooperation. 
Similar to these studies, the present results propose that humans are naturally 
predisposed to cooperate with strangers. However, humans switch their default 
decisions, becoming more selfish as thinking time increases. Moreover, similar 
to Rand et al. (2014), this current results suggest that experience with the social 
norms of the society play an important role in the decisions to cooperate in 
modern societies. On the contrary, the current findings oppose those found by 
Tinghög et al. (2013) and Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014). Finally, the 
results eliminate human confusion and mistakes described by Recalde et al. 
(2014); and subsequently in Recalde et al. (2015).  
In the same vein, the present study finds akin propensities to cooperate as 
Rand et al. (2012), but higher than those found by Balaoufas et al. (2014). 
While Rand et al. (2012) finds that intuitive contributions comprise about 67% 
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(of the total amount), falling to 53% with rational decisions; the current study 
finds similar rates of cooperation of around 72% and 52%, respectively. 
Conversely, these rates of cooperation are far higher than the 40% published 
by Balaoufas et al. (2014).  
In terms of the punishment dilemma, the current study has some 
comparable results to previous literature. For instance, Balaoufas et al. (2014) 
finds a 20% of indirect punishment which is similar to the lower boundary of 
the present results (i.e. between 20% and 35% in Figure 7). Likewise, Balaoufas 
et al. (2014) finds that this punitive behavior is mostly executed on male 
violators (27%). This features matches the present findings, suggesting that 
males withhold help to other male violators by 26 pp.  
6.2 Implications 
The findings of this work have four key implications. First and foremost, the 
data provides information to Dutch government agencies about the natural 
interaction between citizens of The Hague, the way they behave and how they 
cooperate with each other. Thus, government agencies and non-governmental 
institutions could design campaigns to improve the trust and helpfulness 
between citizens and to motivate (new) citizens to understand better the norms 
of the Dutch society. This is important as the results clearly show that 
violations of social norms, in this case littering, are likely to be heavily 
punished. For instance, this is important as individuals (such as immigrants) 
that do not follow social norms could engender resentment, damaging social 
efficiency and economic advancement in the long run. 
Second, these findings could reveal more insights with future studies. 
Additional work carried out in societies with different characteristics to those 
found in The Hague could provide deeper comparative perspectives on the 
nature of human cooperation in modern societies. 
The third implication becomes relevant in the way humans negotiate free 
trade agreements, donations and international aid contracts. The present 
findings motivate the development of strategies limiting beneficial options and 
to pressure the partner country to make a fast decision. In this way, the partner 
country would be encouraged to select one of these beneficial options, 
promoting better outcomes for the interested party. For instance, lawyers and 
police officers use the following technique: they pressure witnesses and 
criminals to agree with their propositions or to reveal true facts. Moreover, the 
results suggest that a country could access international aid more easily from 
countries that shared the same norms. Similarly, this implies that matching the 
social norms to the potential donor could improve the access to their 
international aid. Conversely, indirect punishment could become relevant when 
countries do not follow contract norms. In such cases, the affected partner 
countries might refuse future aid/support/cooperation as (a result of an) 
indirect punishment for breaking the norms of a previous agreement.   
The fourth implication could come from research in other fields. As the 
present study outlines distance as a further variable driving social behavior, the 
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results of this research could be used in future developments of urban 
planning, civil engineering, emergency and security strategies or charity 
fundraising schemes. Potential improvements in these areas could advance 
socioeconomic efficiency and economic development in the short and long 
runs.  
6.3 Opportunities for improvement 
The study identifies three potential opportunities for improvement. The first 
opportunity takes into account that participants have difference capabilities to 
process information. Thus, participants could process stimuli faster or slower 
independently of the exposure to a particular dual-reasoning treatment 
(Rubinstein, 2007). Although this concern is eliminated by randomly assigning 
participants to the treatments conditions, future research could evaluate their 
heterogeneous cognitive speeds. The second opportunity comprises the 
quickness and/or complexity in the execution of the social dilemmas. Future 
research could explore the effects of different experimental procedures on the 
stability of the findings. The third opportunity recognizes how the 
assertiveness and attention of the visual system, the valued importance of the 
event and the speed of the event may shape human behavior (Fehr & Rangel, 
2011). Future research could advance the exploration of these considerations.  
6.4 Avenues for future research 
This study distinguishes three avenues for future research. The first avenue 
could investigate regional, intergenerational and individual differences. Thus, 
future research could assess the propensities to cooperate and punish between 
urban and rural areas, younger and older people, and among people with 
different physical characteristics. The second path could assess how other 
social norms could vary the present findings. The third avenue for future 
research may study the areas of activation of the human brain when indirect 
punishment is exercised. This could expand the understanding of the processes 
of decision making of this particular social behavior.  
7 Conclusions 
This research paper studied the nature of human cooperation. The study 
examined whether humans are predisposed to selfishness or altruism, and, 
whether people switch their default behavior when there is more time to think. 
This research paper expands the latter questions to analyze punitive behavior 
and the effects of the gender of the individual. To investigate these issues, the 
study relied on a natural field experiment exogenously varying average human 
walking time.   
The present findings suggest a causal effect of thinking time on human 
behavior. While the citizens of The Hague are innately predisposed to be 
altruistic with strangers, they shift their default response to behave more 
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selfishly when they have more time to respond. Furthermore, the citizens of 
The Hague naturally withhold help to those that fail to follow social norms and 
the disinclination to help increases with response time. Moreover, the current 
findings are comparable with the published literature in the field and 
econometric analysis confirm the consistency of the results. 
The present findings are important in many areas of current debate to 
governments around the World. Governments may design campaigns to 
motivate immigrants and local citizens to understand the norms of their new 
societies. The results imply that in order to create a more integrated society 
needs to be a greater understanding and appreciation of the social norms of the 
country. By doing this, the society would increase in trust and efficiency. 
However, falling to do this may lead to punitive behavior affecting the social 
cohesion and economic socio-economic efficiency. In particular, these results 
could indicate actions to be taken by the government of The Netherland in 
regard to the current Syrian immigration as well as other governments 
experiencing strong legal and illegal immigration (such as Costa Rica with 
immigrants from Nicaragua or the United States with Mexicans).  
The results could also have important implications in international 
negotiations and access to international aid. The results suggest that 
cooperation between countries may be strengthened if they follow the same 
social norms. Thus, a country attempting to access international aid may find it 
easier to access aid if it shares the same norms as potential donors. In addition, 
the present results suggest that better negotiation techniques would limit 
options (all beneficial) and pressure the donor partner to decide one of them 
quickly. This would encourage the adoption of one of the beneficial options, 
promoting better outcomes. Moreover, countries should recognize that 
breaking the (contract) norms of the donor partner may encourage indirect 
repercussions (such as withholding future aid and cooperation) from the 
affected country as a penalty of breaking the norms of the previous agreement. 
Thus, the present results can improve future negotiating strategies enhancing 
the outcomes of the country in interest.  
Last but not least, future research could expand the understanding in 
different other issues. Future focus on regional and individual differences. 
Future studies could assess the decisions to cooperate and punish between 
urban and rural areas and between contrasting societies. Similarly, future 
experiments could assess how physical characteristics and the heterogeneity in 
the cognitive speeds of participants could change the current findings. Finally, 
future studies on different societies could provide more insights on the way 
human cooperation evolve in the process of modernization across societies.  
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Appendices 
A. Photos of Natural Field Experiment 
Photo 1 
Cooperation in the short time-distance treatment 
 
Note: The actress recreates the cooperation treatment and the short time- 
distance treatment on a female participant.  
 
Photo 2 
Cooperation in the long time-distance treatment 
 
Note: The actress recreates the cooperation treatment and the long time- 
distance treatment on a male participant.  
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Photo 3 
Indirect punishment with long time-distance treatment 
 
Note: The actor recreates the indirect punishment dilemma and the long time- 
distance treatment on a female participant. Notice the empty plastic bottle and  
the glove in the scene. 
Photo 4 
Characteristics of location and position of researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The location and the position of the researcher encourages private and  
anonymous decisions. First, the location promotes that participants make decisions  
when they are alone (no other individual comes in the opposite direction or is near  
them). Second, the researcher locates in the opposite side of the preceding bench.  
In this picture, the researcher waits for a participant coming from the opposite side  
of the sidewalk. 
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Photo 5 
Characteristics of participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A participant must meet four characteristics:  
(1) alone and attentive,  
(2) he/she is unknown to the actor and researcher,  
(3) there is no other  
subject coming in the opposite direction of the sidewalk and,  
(4) the participants is not visibly in a rush.  
 
Photo 6 
Location, front view 
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Photo 7 
Location, left view 
 
 
Photo 8 
Location, right view 
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Photo 1 
Location, back view 
 
Photo 10 
Example of helping-behavior: participant bends over,  
picks the glove up and gives it back to actor 
 
Note: The participant decides to help the actor. In this case, the participant bends  
over, picks the glove up and gives it back to the actor at Point A. 
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Photo 2 
Example of helping-behavior: voice alert and pointing 
 
Note: The participant decides to help the actor. In this case, the participant  
gives a voice alert and points to the actor at Point A. 
 
Photo 3 
Indirect punishment with short time-distance treatment and helping-behavior: 
participant deflects 
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Photo 4 
The actor surveys the participant after the experiment 
 
Note: The actress follows the participant after the experiment is over. Then, the actress interviews the 
participant using the survey ex-post experiment. This survey obtains additional individual characteristics 
of the participant. 
Photo 14 
Close-up of the actor surveying the participant after the experiment 
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B. Surveys 
B.1 Experimental template and post-experimental survey  
Section A. Experiment. 
A1. Time dimension, 
    1.         Time pressure. 
    2.         Time delay. 
A2. Social-dilemma,  
    1.         Cooperation. 
    2.         Punishment. 
A3. Gender dimension,  
    1.         Female. 
    2.         Male. 
A4. Day time,  
    1.         Morning. 
    2.         Afternoon. 
 
Section B. Results. 
B1. Behavioral response,  
    1.         Cooperates. 
    2.         Punishes (directly). 
    3.         Deflects. 
B2. Qualitative behavior, 
    1.         Looks around. 
    2.         Hesitates. 
    3.        Touches actor and points object. 
    4.         Bends over, picks and gives back. 
    5.         Yells and points to alert. 
 
Section C.  Post-experimental survey for participants’ data 
After each participant crossed Point A, the actor/actress followed the 
participant and asked: “Excuse me, I am a researcher of Erasmus University and I 
just (littered and) dropped my glove as an experiment. Could I ask you a few quick 
questions? We can walk together if you want”. 
 
C1. Did you see the (littering) and the drop of the glove ? 0. Yes ______. 1. No ______.   
C2. How willing are you to take risks in general? From 0 to 10 where max. is 10: ______.  
C3. What is your height in cm? ______ cm.  
C4. What is your age? ______ years.  
C5. How long have you lived in The Netherlands? ______ (in years / months).  
C6. How difficult was to make the decision of what to do? 0. Not at all ______. 1. Just a little 
______. 2. Quite ______. 3. A lot ______. 
C7. Comments ____________________________________________________________ . 
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B.2 Cooperation survey-based interview 
CS1. Consider the following situation: you are in this park walking towards a stranger. Sud-
denly, when you are close (about 4.5mts) the stranger drops one glove not noticing it. Do 
you think you would help the stranger?  
    1.         No, I would not. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I am sure.  
 
CS2. Consider a similar situation, but now you realize the glove drop at a longer distance 
(about 15mts). Do you think you would help the stranger?   
    1.         No, I would not. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I am sure.  
 
C3 is divided in two alternatives to each half of the sample. CS3a. In particular, do you 
think a quicker decision encourages you to help? CS3b. In particular, do you think a more 
delayed decision would encourage you to help?  
    1.         No, I do not think so. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I think so.  
 
CS4. How long have you lived in The Netherlands? _______________(in years / months).  
 
CS5. How helpful do you consider the society of The Netherlands?  
    1.         Not helpful at all. 
    2.         Just a little helpful. 
    3.         Quite helpful. 
    4.         Highly helpful. 
 
CS6. How often do you come to Park Malieveld? 
    1.         Less than once a week. 
    2.         Once / Twice a week.  
    3.         Three to five times a week.  
    4.         More than five times a week.  
 
CS7. Age. _____ years. 
 
CS8. Gender,  
    1.         Female. 
    2.         Male. 
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B.3 Indirect punishment survey-based interview 
P1. Consider the following situation: you are in this park walking towards a stranger. Sud-
denly, when you are close (about 4.5mts) the stranger litters and then drops one glove not 
noticing it. Do you think you would help the stranger?  
    1.         No, I would not. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I am sure.  
 
P2. Consider a similar situation, but now you realize the stranger litters and then drops a 
glove from a longer distance (about 13mts). Do you think you would help the stranger this 
time?   
    1.         No, I would not. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I am sure.  
P3 is divided in two alternatives to each half of the sample. P3a. In particular, do you 
think having less time to decide encourages you to help? P3b. In particular, do you think 
having more time to decide would encourages you to help? 
    1.         No, I do not think so. 
    2.         Most probably not. 
    3.         Most probably yes. 
    4.         Yes, I think so.  
P4. How long have you lived in The Netherlands? _______________ (in years or months).  
P5. How helpful do you consider the society of The Netherlands is?  
    1.         Not helpful at all. 
    2.         Just a little helpful. 
    3.         Quite a lot helpful. 
    4.         Highly helpful. 
P6. How often do you come to Park Malieveld? 
    1.         Less than once a week. 
    2.         Once / Twice a week. 
    3.         Three to five times a week. 
    4.         More than five times a week. 
P7. Age, ______ years. 
P8. Gender, 
    1.         Female. 
    2.         Male. 
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C. Robustness checks 
C.1 Cooperation  
Table 9 
Placebo test for cooperation: risk and height levels 
 
Source:  author’s estimation from Artavia (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risk 0.018 
 
0.015 0.013 0.019 
 
0.015 0.014 
 (0.024) 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Height 
 
0.006 0.005 0.006 
 
0.006 0.005 0.006 
 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0)    
-0.186* 
   
-0.172* 
   
(0.084) 
   
(0.085) 
Constant 0.552** -0.323 -0.362 -0.326 0.549** -0.354 -0.396 -0.358 
 (0.147) (0.735) (0.734) (0.724) (0.147) (0.736) (0.735) (0.725) 
N 125 123 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic cov.    X    X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 10 
Placebo test for cooperation: interaction term of risk levels 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.375** -0.375** -0.405** -0.375** -0.375** -0.406** 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.127) 
Full sample risk 
(1=m>  m≤ ) 
-0.181+ -0.143 -0.121 
   
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106) 
   
Full sample interaction  
Distance*Risk 
0.281+ 0.313+ 0.328+ 
   
(0.166) (0.170) (0.168) 
   
Age 
  
0.005 
  
0.005 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
Male  
(=1, female=0)   
0.106 
  
0.116 
  
(0.089) 
  
(0.089) 
Country most lived  
(The Netherlands=1, other=0)   
0.106 
  
0.112 
  
(0.115) 
  
(0.115) 
Ack. sample risk 
(1=m>  m≤ )    
-0.143 -0.150 -0.129 
   
(0.106) (0.107) (0.108) 
Ack. sample interaction  
Distance*Risk    
0.316+ 0.339* 0.355* 
   
(0.168) (0.171) (0.169) 
Constant 0.833** 0.833** 0.459* 0.833** 0.833** 0.473* 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.185) (0.077) (0.077) (0.189) 
N 137 125 125 128 123 123 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic covariates   X   X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 11 
Placebo test for cooperation: interaction term of height levels  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.237+ -0.237+ -0.297* -0.228+ -0.228+ -0.289* 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) 
Full sample height 
(1=m>  m≤ ) 
0.057 0.121 -0.004 
   
(0.109) (0.108) (0.127) 
   
Full sample interaction 
Distance*Height 
0.074 0.098 0.172 
   
(0.165) (0.167) (0.171) 
   
Age   
0.005 
  
0.005 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
Male 
(=1, female=0) 
  
0.042 
  
0.041 
  
(0.105) 
  
(0.107) 
Country most lived 
(The Netherlands=1, 
Other=0) 
  
0.098 
  
0.101 
  
(0.121) 
  
(0.122) 
Ack. sample height 
(1=m>  m≤ ) 
   
0.136 0.136 0.005 
   
(0.108) (0.108) (0.135) 
Ack. sample interaction 
Distance* Height 
   
0.082 0.082 0.185 
   
(0.165) (0.165) (0.174) 
Constant 
0.686** 0.686** 0.422* 0.676** 0.676** 0.436* 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.167) (0.082) (0.082) (0.169) 
N 137 125 125 128 128 123 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic cov.   X   X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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C.2 Indirect punishment  
Table 12 
Placebo test for indirect punishment: risk and height levels 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risk 0.025 
 
0.021 0.020 0.026 
 
0.022 0.021 
(0.026) 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
(0.027) (0.026) 
Height 
 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Time-distance  
(short=0, long=1)    
-0.169+ 
   
-0.162 
   
(0.100) 
   
(0.100) 
Constant 0.306* 0.546 0.390 0.691 0.304* 0.612 0.457 0.737 
(0.153) (0.772) (0.782) (0.797) (0.153) (0.777) (0.786) (0.800) 
N 108 105 104 104 107 104 103 103 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Risk + Height    X    X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 13 
Placebo test for indirect punishment: interaction term of risk levels 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance  
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.101 -0.101 -0.100 -0.101 -0.101 -0.102 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.142) (0.139) (0.139) (0.142) 
Full sample risk 
(1=m>  m≤ ) 
0.042 0.149 0.161    
(0.131) (0.140) (0.136)    
Full sample interaction 
Distance*Risk 
-0.057 -0.127 -0.133 
   
(0.178) (0.191) (0.196) 
   
Age   0.001   0.001 
  (0.004)   (0.004) 
Male 
(=1, female=0) 
  -0.177+   -0.173+ 
  (0.100)   (0.100) 
Country most lived 
(The Netherlands=1, Other=0) 
  0.075   0.061 
  (0.137)   (0.142) 
Ack. sample risk 
(1=m> m≤ ) 
   0.097 0.149 0.160 
   (0.133) (0.140) (0.137) 
Ack. sample interaction  
Distance*Risk 
   -0.048 -0.113 -0.123 
   (0.185) (0.192) (0.197) 
Constant 0.458** 0.458** 0.449* 0.458** 0.458** 0.461* 
(0.103) (0.104) (0.214) (0.103) (0.104) (0.217) 
N 130 109 109 120 108 108 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Dem. controls   X   X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 14 
Placebo test for indirect punishment: interaction term of height levels 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time-distance 
(long=1, short=0) 
-0.208 -0.208 -0.189 -0.196 -0.196 -0.184 
(0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
Full sample height 
(1=m> m≤ ) 
-0.130 -0.055 0.110 
   
(0.134) (0.143) (0.166) 
   
Full sample interaction 
Distance*Height 
0.099 0.067 0.046 
   
(0.179) (0.195) (0.193) 
   
Age   
0.001 
  
0.001 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
Male 
(=1, Female=0) 
  
-0.262* 
  
-0.256+ 
  
(0.130) 
  
(0.131) 
Country most lived 
(The Netherlands=1, Other=0) 
  
-0.006 
  
-0.013 
  
(0.152) 
  
(0.154) 
Ack. sample risk 
(1=m> m≤ ) 
   
-0.084 -0.055 0.108 
   
(0.137) (0.143) (0.167) 
Ack. sample interaction  
Distance*Height 
   
0.102 0.055 0.042 
   
(0.187) (0.196) (0.194) 
Constant 
0.571** 0.571** 0.591** 0.571** 0.571** 0.599** 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.203) (0.110) (0.110) (0.205) 
N 130 109 109 120 108 108 
Sample Full Acknowledged 
Demographic cov.   X   X 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars denote significance levels at + p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
